






































































































































































LDP DPJ DPJ÷LDPLDP DPJ DPJ÷LDP
．4∫α乃∫ 1752 1493 85％ 2772 1835 66％
yb醒∫μr∫ 1803 1548 86％ 2762 1886 68％
物’πゴc配 1731 1564 90％ 2513 1427 57％
2003／10／11－20 2005／8／9－18
LDP DPJ DPJ÷LDPLDP DPJ DPJ÷LDP
．4∫α配 512 401 78％ 789 454 58％
｝わ〃2∫πr∫ 519 444 86％ 860 509 59％































































































































Postal　service3L2 33．0 28．8 22．4
Social　security30．6 30．0 41．8 37．8
Financial　matter25．0 25．8 一 23．0
Diplomatic　issues7．2 7．2 4．8 3．2

































































































































Total 168 105 219 52
10　Masamichi　Ida（2002）“Senkyoron（Election）”In　Takashi　Takeo　and　Ida，　eds．，　Gendaisei’i
　　　wo　Miraルfe（A　n　Iηtroductゴon’o　ContemporaリプPo’itics）Tokyo：Yachiyo　Shuppan，　p．91．
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candidate　and　voters．　Solid　votes　for　individual　candidates　are　a　minority　in
urban　areas．　However，　there　is　a　close　relation　between　candidates（assembly
members）and　the　voters　in　rural　areas，　and　there　are　many　candidate　votes．
Therefore，　in　urban　areas，　many　voters　vote　for　the　party，　not　for　the　candidate．
In　rural　areas，　however，　many　voters　vote　for　the　candidate，　not　fbr　the　party．
Party　voting　is　easily　influenced　by　the　political　situation　at　that　time．
　　　　Next，　we　try　to　examine　the　vote　share　of　the　proportional　representation
section．　Comparing　results　for　2003　and　2005，　the　LDP　vote　share　increased　by
3．2points．　Additionally，　the　DPJ　vote　share　decreased　6．4　points．　New
Komeito　and　Japanese　Communist　Party（JCP）had　slight　decreases，　and　Social
Democratic　Party（SDP）saw　a　marginal　rise．　It　can　be　said　that　the　increase
in　turnout　rate　in　2005　was　disadvantageous　for　the　New　Komeito　and　JCP．
　　　　Figures　3　and　4　plot　the　LDP　and　DPJ　vote　share　in　PR　tier　by　eleven　block
in　the　2003　and　2005　general　elections．
　　　　The　LDP　extended　its　vote　share　in　blocks　with　many　urban　areas．　The
LDP　vote　share　increased　in　Minamikanto，　Tokyo，　and　Kinki，　and　Tokai
blocks．　However，　the　LDP　vote　share　did　not　increase　in　Hokkaido，　Tohoku，
Hokusin－etsu，　Chugoku，　Shikoku，　and　Kyushu　blocks．　In　other　words，　the
expansion　of　the　LDP　support　because　of　the　Koizumi’s　popularity　was　intense
in　metropolitan　areas，　especially　the　metropolitan　areas　in　the　Kanto　region．
The　LDP　vote　share　is　dropping　the　vote　share　in　Hokkaido．
　　　　For　the　LDP，　only　the　structural　reform　was　proven　to　be　the　most　effec－
tive　of　the　city　measures．　In　the　general　election　of　2000，　the　LDP　fought　hard
in　urban　areas，　and　it　was　necessary　to　response　to　urban　voters．
　　　　In　contrast，　the　DPJ　vote　share　increased　only　in　Shikoku　Block，　and
dropped　sharply　in　Minamikanto，　Tokyo，　and　the　Kinki　blocks．　The　reason　of
DPJ　vote　share　increased　in　the　urban　areas　in　the　2000　election　may　be　inter－
preted　that　the　urban　voter　judged　the　DPJ　to　be　more　ardent　in　structural
refbrm　than　the　LDP　at　that　time．　However，　in　the　2005　election，　the　urban
voters　judged　the　LDP　to　be　more　ardent　supPortive　of　structural　reform　than
the　DPJ．　In　other　words，　the　orientation　toward　small　government　especially
appealed　to　urban　voters．　The　results　of　the　2000　and　2005　elections　imply　that
the　policy　on　structural　reform　is　the　most　effective　for　attracting　urban　voters．
　　　　Moreover，　the　LDP，　has　conducted　an　electoral　campaign　centered　on　the
individual　supporters’association　organization“Koenkai．”The　electoral　cam－
paign　can　be　said　to　have　a“Ground　battle　style”．
　　　　It　has　’been　assumed　that　this　is　a　factor　of　strength　in　a　long　series　of　LDP
elections．　Moreover，　the　ground　battle　is　especially　effective　in　rural　areas
where　the　relation　between　the　voter　and　the　assembly　member（or　candidate）
is　more　intimate．　However，　the　effect　is　limited　in　urban　areas　where　the　rela－
tion　among　residents　is　comparatively　weak，　and　thus　the　LDP　remained　a　rural
type　political　party．
　　　　The　DPJ　has　less　powerful　organization　than　the　LDP，　and　has　tried　to
bring　an“Air　fight　Style”into　the　electoral　campaign．　The　air　fight　electora1
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Data　Source：71ie　14sahi　Shi〃2bun，　November　lO，2003　and　September　12，2005．
　　　　　　　　Figure　3　LDP　vote　share　by　PR　block
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Data　Source：The／Asahi　Shimbun，　November　lO，2003　and　September　12，2005．
　　　　　　　　Figure　4　DPJ　vote　share　by　PR　block
campaign　is　a　policy－centered　campaign　that　uses　the　mass　media，　and　empha－
sizes　the　party　leader’s　image．
　　　　The　2000　electoral　campaign　was　held　under　the　circumstance　of　low　ap－
proval　rating　f（）r　the　Mori　Cabinet，　so　the　DPJ　tried　to　set　an　agenda　in　which
the　election　is　a　selection　between　Prime　Minister　Mori　and　Prime　Minister
Hatoyama（the　party　leader　of　the　DPJ　at　that　time）．
　　　　Moreover，　introducing　the　manifesto　in　the　2003　electoral　campaign　fur－
ther　developed　the　air－fight　campaign．　This　air－fight　style　was　especially　effec－
tive　in　urban　parts．　that　have　many　non－aligned　voters．　As　a　result，　the　DPJ　had
characteristics　of　an　urban　political　party．
　　　　However，　after　the　Koizumi　administration　took　control　in　2001，　the　LDP
began　implementing　an　air－fight　style　campaign．　The　LDP　thus　overwhelmed
the　DPJ　by　maximum　uses　of　Koizumi’s　popularity　and　Makiko　Tanaka’s　popu一
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larity　in　the　Upper　House　election　in　2001，　and　that　became　a“Success　experi－
ence，，．
　　　　The　decline　of　party．　loyalty　among　Japanese　voters　was　mainly　caused　by
the　l　990’s　political　events；especially　the　split　of　the　LDP　in　l　993．　As　a　results，
the　air　fight　type　of　campaign　was　necessary　to　extend　the　LDP．
　　　　For　instance，　the　sum　of　the　LDP　votgs　in　the　PR　tier　in　Tokyo，　the　capital
of　Japan，　was　l．02　million　in　the　l998　Upper　House　election　and　1．ll　million
votes　in　the　2000　Lower　House　election．　However，　the　LDP　gained　1．76　million
votes　in　the　2001　Upper　House　election　due　to　Koizumi’s　high　popularity．　At
that　time，　the　approval　rate　fbr　Koizumi　Cabinet　exceeded　70％．　The　increase
of　the　LDP　vote　share　in　the　2001　Upper　House　election　was　especially　high　in
the　urban　areas　of　Tokyo，　Osaka，　Kanagawa，　and　Saitamall．
Imptications　of　the　2005　general　election
　　　　Finally，　we　will　briefly　discuss　the　implication　of　the　2005　general　election
which　had　significance　fbr　Japanese　politics．　The　author　thinks　that　this　elec－
tion　result　doesn’t　mean　the　revival　of　LDP　dominance，　but　it　is　a　step　toward
two－party　system．　Because　the　number　of　vote　for　DP工maintained　high　level
（over　twenty　million　votes）．
　　　　In　addition，　the　2005　election　exhibited　the　presidentialization　of　Japanese
politics．　Thomas　Poguntke　and　Paul　Webb　defined　the　presidentialization　of
politics　in　their　book　The　Presidentializatゴon（～プP（）litics’1重Comparative　Study（るヂ
MOdern　1）emOCraCieS　aS　f（）llOWS：
1
2
3
Leadership　power　resources：The　head　of　govemment　has　superior　ex－
ecutive　power　resource，　for　instance，　the　power　to　legitimate　and　to
form　a　cabinet．
Leadership　Autonomy：The　head　of　the　executive　enjoys．autonomy　to
his　own　party　and　the　political　executive　of　the　state．
Personalization　of　the　electoral　process：Electoral　process　are　dicisively
moulded　by　the　personalities　of　party　leaders．
　　　　It　follows　from　this　that　de　facto　presidentialization　of　politics　can　be　un－
derstood　as　the　development　of（a）increasing　leadership　power　resources　and
autonomy　within　the　party　and　political　executive　respectively，　and（b）increas－
ingly　leadership－centered　electoral　processes．　Essentially，　three　central　arenas　of
democratic　govemment　are　affected　by　these　changes，　the　executive　face，　the
party　face　and　the　electoral　face，　respectivelyl2．
ll
12
Masamichi　Ida（2007）Nihon　Sei　’i　no　7ンoryu（η！eπ4e　qズJapanese　Politics）Tokyo：Hokuju
Shuppan，　P．69．
Thomas　Poguntke　and　Paul　Webb（2005）T7ie　Presidentialization　of　Politics　of　1）emocratゴc
Soc剃ε3．のA　Framework　for　Analysis，，　In　Poguntke　and　Webb，　eds．，η昭Presidentialization（ゾ
Politics：　A　Comparative　Study（ゾルfbdern　1）emocracies．　Oxford：Oxford　University　Press，　p．5．
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　　　　The　periods　of　the　Koizumi　administration　and　the　2005　elec‡ion　demon－
strated　that　there　were　developments　of（a）increasing　Prime　Minister　power
resources　within　the　party　and　political　autonomy　of　the　executive，　and（b）
increasingly　leadership－centered　electoral　campaign．　Poguntke　and　Webb　said
many　democratic　political　systems　are　coming　to　operate　according　an　essell－
tially　presidential　logic，　irrespective　of　their　formal　constitutional　make－up．
The　author　think　the　tendency　applies　also　in　Japan．　And，　the　tendency　ap－
peared　remarkably　in　the　2005　election．
　　　　Prime　Minister’s　power　increased　in　the　age　of　Koizumi　administration．
For　instance，　a　Japanese　Political　Scientist　Harukata　Takenaka　expressed　it
“Prime　Minister　rule（In　Japanese，　Shusho　Shihai）”13．　The　compilation　of
Koizumi　politics　was　the　dissolution　and　general　election　in　2005．　We　can
say　that　the　result　of　the　2005　general　election　is　caught　with　the　victory　of
“Koizumi”rather　than　the　victory　of　the　LDP．
　　　　The　main　cause　of　the　presidentialization　was　the　political　reform　in　the
1990’s．The　power　of　the　party　leadership　increased　when　the　SMD　system　was
introduced　into　the　electoral　system　of　the　lower　house　election　and　political
party　and　party　leader’s　influence　became　stronger　than　that　of　an　individual
candidate．　In　that　sense，　the　2005　election　was　a　consequence　of　the　political
reform．
　　　　Of　course，　the　weakening　relation　between　the　political　party　and　Japanese
voter　also　operated　in　the　background．　Many　Japanese　voters，　disillusioned　and
frustrated　with　politics　since　the　bollapse　of　the　Hosokawa　coalition　in　l994，
gave　up　all　party　affiliations　and　became　independents．　Consequently，　the　influ－
ence　of　long－term　factors　such　as　ideology　and　party　identification　has　been
declining　in　Japan　during　the　past　decade．　The　mobilizing　power　of　social
groups，　such　as　industry　organizations　and　labor　unions，　also　has　been　weaken－
ing．　Short－term　factors，　including　political　issues　and　politicians’popularity，　on
the　other　hand，　have　gained　influence　on　voting　behavior　and　suggest　an　in－
creasing　influence　of　the　mass　media　in　Japanese　election　campaigns．　Koizumi’s
landslide　victory　in　the　2005　general　election，　for　example，　might　be　attributable
to　his　superb　strategy　and　compelling　appeals　to　the　public　through　television．
The　medium　seemed　to　help　Koizumi　put　his‘‘own”issue，　privatization　of
postal　services，　on　the　top　of　the　election　agenda　and　transform　the　election　into
asingle－issue　referendum．　The　weakening　influence　of　long－term　factors　and
the　increasing　use　of　the　mass　media　in　the　political　arena　finally　appear　to　push
Japan　into　the　age　of　modern　media　politicsl4．
13
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Harukata　Takenaka（2006）Shusho　Shihai（Prime　Minister　Rule）Tokyo：Chuokoron－
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See　Toshio　Takeshita　and　Masam童chi　Ida（2009）“Political　Communication　in　Japan”，　In
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